Seite ist noch im Aufbau

In Manila (Philippinen) und in Jakarta (Indonesien) existieren große Beteiligungen privater Unternehmen im Wassersektor, die jedoch noch keine konkreten Ergebnisse vorweisen können. Jakarta zum Beispiel besitzt Wasserversorgungs- und Entwässerungssysteme für 500 000 Personen. In der Zwischenzeit leben aber ungefähr 15 Millionen Einwohner in der Stadt, was zur massiven Übernutzung der Grundwasserressourcen führt, und dies, obwohl erst 25% der Bevölkerung Zugang zu Wasser hat. Das Wasser ist zudem stark versalzen, weil der Grundwasserspiegel heute 30 m unter dem Meeresspiegel liegt. Bei einer solchen Tiefe ist der Wasserzugang mittels Brunnen praktisch nicht mehr möglich (Sundblad, 1999). (Quelle: waterstudy_d.pdf; SAM Research, September 2001)


Indonesien:

Betreiber:
Modell: Managementverträge
Kategorie/Einschätzung: gut
Quelle: pospap BT EWlä H2o.pdf
Wer arbeitet dazu?: Hoering 2001:30).
Zitat: Eine Möglichkeit,bestehende Managementdefizite vor Ort zu beseitigen ohne die Kontrolle an Privatunternehmen abzutreten, sind Partnerschaften zwischen etablierten und erfolgreichen öffentlichen Wasserversorgern mit solchen mit Reformbedarf. Diese auch als "Twinning " bezeichneten Partnerschaften in Transformations- und Entwicklungsländern wurden insbesondere in den baltischen Ländern erfolgreich praktiziert.90 Sie sind häufig Teil von Gesamtfinanzierungspaketen (Hall 2001:4,27). In Indonesien unterstützen beispielsweise holländische Wasserversorger indonesische Stadtwerke mit Geld und Beratung (Hoering 2001:30).


Jakarta, Indonesia

Wer when the World Bank agreed to provide a $92 million loan for water infrastructure, Bank officials were already advising the Suharto government to privatize. With key multilateral (World Bank) and bilateral (Japan) loans in place, the major corporate conglomerates Suez and Thames, began making moves to takeover the public water system.
Wann: In the early 1990s
Art von Partnerschaft: Thames formed an alliance with the Sigit Group, controlled by Suharto's eldest son, Sugit Harjojudanto. Suez worked with a Suharto business crony, Anthony Salim, CEO of one of Indonesia's largest companies, the Salim Group. in 1997, after protracted private negotiations, the contracts were simply awarded to the two new entities. Thames' partnership with Sigit Group was called PT Kekar Pola Airindo and the Suez partnership with Salim Group became PT Garuda Dipta Semesta. The new 25-year contracts with PAM Jaya, the municipal water supplier, were expected to be lucrative for both the international and local partners. One prediction set Thames pre-tax profits at $25 million by the tenth year of the contract. The new companies immediately moved into posh new offices in Jakarta's business district rather than using the older office space where PAM Jaya had operated. The salaries paid to the foreign executives, who lived in the wealthiest neighborhoods, were much higher than those paid to PAM Jaya officials causing much resentment among the employees. The contracts required the new companies to not only manage the system, but in the first five years to expand the existing pipeline, invest $318 million, add 1.5 million customers, service 70 percent of the population, increase water supply, and reduce "unaccounted-for" water. PAM Jaya agreed to force businesses and private homes to shut down private wells and buy their water from the companies. (In 1997, about 70 percent of water used in Jakarta came from private wells.) In 1998, the Asian financial crisis and the downfall of Suharto changed the political landscape. Fearful of protest in the streets, major company executives from Suez and Thames fled to the safety of Singapore. Faced with an immediate water crisis, Jakarta's new governor ordered PAM Jaya to fill the vacuum and take back the operation. After intensive lobbying, including intervention by French and British diplomatic officials, and a statement from the British Embassy that "breaching of the contract would weaken confidence in Indonesia as a place to invest," the agreement was made to let Suez and Thames return, but the contract would need to be re-negotiated. Since Suharto had fled, and the former president's family and business partners were targets of public anger, Thames and Suez agreed to buy-out the local shares of their business operations in order to remove the tarnish of the Suharto family connections.
Bemerkungen: The fact that national law and local regulation prohibited foreign investment in drinking water delivery and precluded private sector involvement in community drinking water supply was, apparently, irrelevant. As might be imagined, investment and expansion targets were never met, but there was also no reliable mechanism for verification of company reports. Suez claimed it had increased connections 50%, falling short of the 70% target. Investment was about $200 million short of the target. Water services in Jakarta's rich, middle-class and industrial areas improved. However, most poor communities remain without piped water due to unaffordable connection charges, informal tenure arrangements, and lack of incentives for PAM Jaya or the companies to service these areas. Customers must still boil their water to ensure its safety for drinking.
Weltbank u.a.
There was no open and transparent bidding process, although the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank claims they promote "good governance" and transparent privatization transactions. Quellen
Literatur
Wer arbeitet dazu
Dafür/kritisch/dagegen


Manila/Philipinen

Wer Maynilad Water (co-owned by Suez and a wealthy Filipino family)
The Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) granted the rights to operate and expand water and sewerage service to Manila Water (co-owned by Bechtel and the Ayala family) and Maynilad Water (co-owned by Ondeo/Suez and the Lopez family).
Ayala Corp.; United Utilities, Suez
Wann: Vor 2,5 Jahren (?) …25-year lease agreements in Manila were the biggest water privatizations in the world when they took place in 1997
Art von Partnerschaft25-year lease agreements
Bemerkungen: massiven Preiserhöhungen und von Massenentlassungen als Folgen der Privatisierung. Bei der Privatisierung ging die Lizenz für die West-Zone an ein Konsortium von Ayala Corp., der britischen United Utilities und den US-Konzern Bechtel. Die Lizenz für die Ost-Zone wurde an Maynilad vergeben, die im Besitz der Benpres Holding und der französischen Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux ist. Inzwischen ist auch Vivendi (Générale-des-Eaux), der grösste Konkurrent von Suez, in einzelnen Stadtteilen Manilas vertreten. Laut David Hall wurde die Privatisierung wieder rückgängig gemacht.
Quelle: Blue Planet
ZitateCivil society groups have criticized the non-democratic and non-transparent nature of the privatization process, the rate hikes (which include an adjustment tied to exchange rate losses), the unmet promises of rehabilitation and expansion of water services (especially to the urban poor), and weak regulatory and oversight practices. Advised by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector lending arm of the World Bank, Manila sought to privatize MWSS in the mid 1990's. When Suez entered Manila in 1997 it was with a promise to lower rates and expand the infrastructure for the 7.5 million households the concession covered. The promise was to provide water for 4.96 pesos. While the government claimed this price was guaranteed until 2007, in reality the contract had several mechanisms permitting "extraordinary price adjustments." Other promises included 100% infrastructure coverage by 2007, US$7.5 billion new investments over 25 years. Unaccounted water would fall to 32% in 2007 and the city would save US$4 billion over 25 years. Only a year into the contract, Maynilad asked for the first rate increase. In 2001, the price rose to 6.58 pesos with subsequent hikes to 10.79 pesos, 11.39 pesos and 15.46 pesos. In the end, Maynilad cancelled the contract when the regulatory commission rejected an additional rate increase to 27 pesos. When Maynilad decided to exit, control of the waterworks reverted to MWSS. Maynilad claimed that the city had not met its obligations and brought the dispute to the International Chamber of Commerce. The case is scheduled for hearing in May 2003. Maynilad is seeking US$303 million in compensation from the government. In addition, MWSS will now have to take on $530 million in loan payments to creditors. The residents of Manila will pay the costs of these additional debts. Weltbank u.a.
Government elites and the World Bank have been determined to tout the privatization as a success story.
Quellen
Literatur
Wer arbeitet dazu
Dafür/kritisch/dagegen


Orangi, Karachi/ Pakistan

Akteure: : Orangi-Pilotprojekts OPP
Wann:?
Bemerkung: In diesem Slum von Karachi wurde weitgehend durch Selbsthilfe und Eigenarbeit ein kostengünstiges öffentliches Abwassersystem für 600000 Menschen geschaffen
Quelle: Uwe Hörig/WEED